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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-1107 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM DAVENPORT, 
also known as Little One 
 
William Davenport, 
 
Appellant. 
___________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court  
for the Middle District Of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Cr. No. 08-CR-424-06) 
District Judge: Hon. Christopher C. Conner 
___________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
On March 22, 2011 
 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:   April 6, 2011) 
 
 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:  
 Appellant William Davenport appeals from the District Court’s sentence of 199 
months’ imprisonment for conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 
cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride under 21 U.S.C. § 846.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write for the parties, we discuss the facts only to the extent necessary 
for resolution of the issues raised on appeal.  On September 1, 2008, DEA agents 
conducted a search of a  storage facility controlled by Davenport in Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania.  The storage facility consisted of three separate bays, each connected to the 
others through a series of internal doorways.  Inside one bay of the facility agents 
uncovered substantial amounts of drug paraphernalia, as well as 160 grams of cocaine 
hydrochloride.  In a separate bay, they found, among other things, two Cadillacs, one 
containing $14,015 in cash and the other containing a Bryco-Jennings 9 millimeter pistol 
with a loaded 10-round magazine, located between the seat cushions.   
On October 28, 2008, DEA agents executed a search warrant at Davenport’s 
residence in Enola, Pennsylvania, at which time Davenport gave a post-arrest statement 
admitting that he had purchased large quantities of cocaine hydrochloride, cooked the 
cocaine hydrochloride into cocaine base or “crack,” and sold both substances to another 
individual.  He also admitted that the firearm seized from the Cadillac in the storage 
facility was his.  Although Davenport agreed to assist the authorities in the ongoing drug 
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investigation and provided them with helpful information, he later sent a text message to 
a co-conspirator named Juan Matos which read: 
Yo, they watching and following me like a hawk.  I can’t make a move, but 
I’ll be at the spot on time this week. Yo, they know everything you do on 
that phone.  
 
(App. at 25.) 
Davenport pled guilty on July 21, 2009 to one count of conspiracy to distribute 
and possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride and 50 grams 
or more of crack cocaine.  The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) and District 
Court both calculated Davenport’s Guidelines’ sentencing range as 235 to 293 months’ 
imprisonment, but because 21 U.S.C. § 846(b)(1)(C) provides for a statutory maximum 
sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment, the final range was limited to 235 to 240 months.   
Davenport objected to the PSR’s Guidelines calculation on three grounds: (1) the 
alleged unwarranted disparity between his sentence and the sentences received by three 
co-conspirators; (2) the use of the 100-to-1 crack to cocaine ratio in calculating the base 
offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c); and (3) the application of a two-level 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a dangerous weapon in 
connection with a drug trafficking crime.  He also sought a downward variance under 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).  The District Court rejected each of Davenport’s objections, but 
granted a downward variance of 36 months under § 3553(a), sentencing Davenport to 199 
months’ imprisonment.  Three co-conspirators, Yovanny Dejesus, Luis Diaz, and Walter 
Santiago, were sentenced to 57, 60, and 108 months, respectively. 
II. 
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A. 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this criminal matter under 
18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court exercises jurisdiction over Davenport’s appeal under 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Our review of whether a district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence 
upon a criminal defendant is twofold.  We first consider whether the sentencing court 
committed any procedural errors “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) 
the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 
3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to 
adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from 
the Guidelines range.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).  “We review a district 
court’s legal conclusions regarding the Guidelines de novo, . . . its application of the 
Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion, . . . and its factual findings for clear 
error[.]”  United States v. Blackmon, 557 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations 
omitted).  If the district court committed no procedural error, we consider the sentence’s 
substantive reasonableness.  A sentence is substantively unreasonable only if “no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. 
B.  
On appeal, Davenport first contends that the District Court erred in applying the 
two-point enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug 
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trafficking crime despite the absence of evidence that the firearm was used in connection 
with the drug offense.  Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines provides for a two-level 
enhancement if the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon “unless it is clearly 
improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.3.  
Courts have generally relied on four factors when making this determination: (1) whether 
the gun was a handgun; (2) whether the gun was loaded; (3) whether the gun was found 
near the drugs or drug paraphernalia; and (4) whether the gun was accessible.  United 
States v. Drozdowski, 313 F.3d 819, 822-23 (3d Cir. 2002).   
Here, the handgun, which contained a loaded magazine, was found in Davenport’s 
storage facility.  Although the gun was found in one of three bays in the facility, while 
the drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in a separate bay, internal doors made each 
bay easily accessible to the others, all three of which Davenport controlled.  Further, the 
gun was located in the same bay as more than $14,000 in cash.  Finally, Davenport knew 
that the gun was hidden between two seat cushions in one of the Cadillacs, thus making it 
easily accessible to him.   In light of these facts, we cannot say that the District Court 
erred in concluding that it was not “clearly improbable” that the firearm was connected to 
Davenport’s drug conspiracy. 
C. 
 Davenport next contends that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to 
consider the disparity between his sentence and those received by three co-conspirators,  
Yovanny Dejesus, Luis Diaz, and Walter Santiago.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) provides that 
the District Court should consider the “need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities 
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among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”  
(emphasis added).  Here, the District Court noted that the three co-conspirators each 
received considerable downward departures because they cooperated with the 
Government’s investigation.  In contrast, after first agreeing to cooperate, Davenport 
engaged in behavior that obstructed the investigation when he warned a co-conspirator 
via text message that he was being watched and followed and that the co-conspirator’s 
phone was being monitored.  Moreover, DeJesus and Diaz both lacked a criminal record 
and received sentences of 57 and 60 months, respectively, while Santiago had a criminal 
history category of III and received a sentence of 108 months.  In contrast, Davenport had 
a criminal history category of IV.  In light of these highly relevant differences between 
the criminal record and conduct of Davenport and those of his three co-conspirators, the 
District Court’s decision not to vary from the Guidelines on the basis of alleged 
sentencing disparities was not an abuse of discretion. 
D.  
Davenport further argues that the District Court abused its discretion in calculating 
his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) using a crack to cocaine hydrochloride 
ratio of 100 to 1.  He notes that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced that disparity to 
18 to 1, and that Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), and Spears v. United 
States, 129 S.Ct. 840 (2009), permit district courts to categorically reject the Guidelines’ 
crack-cocaine differential as a matter of policy and on that basis impose a sentence 
outside the Guidelines’ sentencing range.   
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Davenport, however, was sentenced in December 2009, before the Fair Sentencing 
Act of 2010 became effective on August 3, 2010.  See Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat 
2372, § 2 (August 3, 2010).  We have also determined that the Fair Sentencing Act does 
not apply retroactively.  See United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 114-15 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Further, we have previously held that a district court is “under no obligation to 
impose a sentence below the applicable Guidelines solely on the basis of the 
crack/powder cocaine differential.”  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Here, the District Court expressly acknowledged its authority to vary from the 
Guidelines based on potential policy disagreements with the crack/powder cocaine 
differential, but declined to do so.  Under our established case law, this was not an abuse 
of discretion.  
E. 
Finally, Davenport argues that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing a 
substantively unreasonable sentence of 199 months pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). 
Specifically, Davenport argues that he should have received a larger variance because of his 
post-arrest admissions, an overstatement of his criminal history category resulting from a state 
court conviction where he was not represented by counsel, his health problems, his daughter’s 
health problems, and his family’s reduced financial circumstances.  Here, the District Court 
carefully and expressly considered the § 3553(a) factors, and noted Davenport and his 
daughter’s health problems, his family’s financial difficulties, his drug addiction, and his 
attempts to assist authorities.  Taking these considerations into account, the District Court 
imposed a sentence that was 36 months below the Guidelines’ sentencing range.  In sum, there is 
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nothing in the record before us to suggest that the sentence here was anything other than 
reasonable. 
 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
